How applicable is the bureau voting model to the United States? Although the literature suggests that government employees are more liberal and vote more Democratic, these findings have recently become inconsistent stateside. In addition, there are strong counterarguments to the premises of the bureau voting model. It is hypothesized that bureaucrats are neither more likely to support Democrats nor more liberal. Using data from the American National Election Studies covering a 30-year period, probit and generalized ordered logit models support these new hypotheses. These results suggest that the bureau voting model may need to be refined for the United States.
Introduction
Are bureaucrats different from the rest of society? This quintessential public administration question has been asked in numerous ways for various reasons over decades, but this article will focus on only one reason: that bureaucrats may rely on their own discretion when implementing and interpreting laws. Although organizational structure and the type of clientele affect how bureaucrats implement policies, personal characteristics are also a factor (Lipsky, 1980; Scott, 1997) . If the employees in the public sector vary systematically from the people they serve, the people may not be receiving the government they truly desire. Because government spending in the United States is projected to grow as a share of gross domestic product (GDP) at least through 2024 (Congressional Budget Office [CBO] , 2014), this question is exceedingly relevant today.
One model approaches this question from an attitudinal and behavioral perspective: the bureau voting model (BVM). The BVM asserts that bureaucrats are more likely to vote, more likely to be liberal, and more likely to vote for Democrats. These factors help to explain the growth of government. This particular model has guided research agendas across the globe for more than two decades. However, studies using contemporary data either show weak, nonexistent, or counterhypothesized effects between government employment, ideology, and vote choice in the United States (Jensen, Sum, & Flynn, 2009; Park & Perry, 2013) . What has happened to the BVM? Did something change? Could something change?
To answer these questions, this article makes two interrelated contributions. First, the premises of the BVM are examined and challenged. This revisitation shows numerous reasons that suggest that a relationship between government employment, ideology, and vote choice may not exist in the United States. Furthermore, these critiques imply that this is not a recent development; in other words, bureaucrats may have never been more liberal or voted more Democratic.
Second, this article also uses sophisticated statistical analysis to model the relationship between government employment, ideology, and vote choice over many decades. Earlier studies of the BVM are limited in their years of study; if some factors of the BVM are time dependent, studies analyzing few years may miss these associations. This article provides a more detailed, longitudinal look at the BVM by analyzing 30 years of time. In addition to probit models, generalized ordered logit models are employed for the first time to study the BVM. These models show that there is no link between government employment and ideology or between government employment and vote choice. Furthermore, this is not a recent effect: at no point does government employment have an effect on ideology or vote choice.
These findings have implications for future work regarding the BVM and the political behavior of bureaucrats. Other models may have to be considered to explain the growth of government. Different approaches may have to be considered when attempting to discern if there are any differences between bureaucrats and nonbureaucrats. This article also speaks to the benefit of reviewing past studies, using longitudinal data, and introducing new modeling techniques.
This article will focus on two hypotheses of the BVM: that bureaucrats are more likely to be liberal and that they are more likely to vote for Democrats. Although the three parts of the theory undoubtedly complement each other, Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud (1991) noted that if the bureau voting model is correct in its contemporary form, one would expect each of these three hypotheses to be supported empirically. Failure to find support for any one of the three would call into question the degree to which this model provides an adequate (or at least partial) explanation of growth in the size of the public sector. (p. 180) This passage suggests that challenging just parts of the BVM is a worthwhile endeavor. Furthermore, the results of recent works have only contradicted these two parts of the BVM (Jensen et al., 2009; Park & Perry, 2013) . Therefore, this article focuses solely on ideology and vote choice.
The article proceeds as follows. The history of the BVM is reviewed, followed by a critique of its assumptions. A description of the data and modeling leads to a review of the results. The article concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications.
Literature Review of the BVM
The foundation of the BVM was laid by Tullock (1972) , who suggested that government growth may be due to bureaucrats using their collective efforts at the polls to vote for expansionary politicians and policies. Empirically based studies soon followed and showed that bureaucrats were more liberal (Aberbach & Rockman, 1976; Meier, 1975) , more likely to support spending increases (Courant, Gramlich, & Rubinfeld, 1980) , more likely to vote (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980) , and more likely to vote Democratic (Blais, Blake, & Dion, 1991) than the general population. The three separate strands of the BVM were then gathered together and formalized by Garand et al. (1991) . These scholars found that bureaucrats were more likely to turn out to vote, more liberal in their political views, and more likely to support Democrats; all of these factors help to explain government growth.
Since its initial articulation, most studies using the BVM have centered on European countries. For example, Wise and Szucs (1996) found that government employees in Sweden were more supportive of liberal policies and leftwing parties. Knutsen (2005) found that public service employees were more likely to support left-of-center parties in a study of eight Western European countries. Tepe (2012) used data from 11 Western European countries and found that factors such as the sector of government employment, occupation status, and the type of service economy add nuance to the BVM. For example, public health, education, and public service production employees are more liberal than public administrators.
However, recent looks at the United States have struggled to replicate the results from earlier studies. For example, Jensen et al. (2009) found a very weak relationship between government employment and ideology and no relationship with vote choice. In addition, Park and Perry (2013) found that government employees were more likely to vote Republican. What may have happened to the BVM in the United States? Why did it work years ago but not today? Do the assertions undergirding the BVM suggest that it may be time dependent? After almost 20 years of neglect stateside, these present-day findings suggest a need to refocus on the premises of the BVM in the United States.
Ideology, Vote Choice, and Bureaucrats
There are various schools of thought on why bureaucrats behave differently from the rest of the population, but two of them are particularly important to the BVM: attitudinal and rational choice. The attitudinal claims draw primarily from the public service motivation (PSM) literature. PSM argues that bureaucrats want to work for the government out of an attraction to public policy making, compassion, and concern for the public weal (Perry, 1996) . Bureaucrats have been found to be more active in civic affairs (Brewer, 2003) , and those high in PSM are more likely to exhibit ethical behavior (Brewer & Selden, 1998) , stay employed longer in public organizations (Bright, 2008) , and perform at higher levels (Bright, 2007; Vandenabeele, 2009) . Ertas (2014) also found that public and nonprofit employees were more likely to engage in political voice activities than those in the private sector. Based on their belief in the power of government, and because Democrats spend more than Republicans when they are in office (Alt & Lowry, 2000; Besley & Case, 2003; Rogers & Rogers, 2000) , these bureaucrats may be more likely to be liberal and to support candidates who would provide them with more resources. These studies suggest that government employees may behave in unique ways due to their attitudes.
The rational choice approach, however, assumes that government employees behave in unique ways due to the nature of their employment. Niskanen (1971) and Tullock (1972) argued that bureaucrats are primarily motivated by selfinterest. The maximand of bureaucrats include increases in salary, reputation, and autonomy (Niskanen, 1971) . To maximize their self-interest, bureaucrats try to expand their budgets or the power of their organization. Again, given the generally budget-minimizing policies of Republicans, this rational choice approach also would expect bureaucrats to vote for Democrats. Because there is considerable overlap between some of the assumptions of both the attitudinal and rational choice approaches, it is not surprising that they reach similar conclusions.
However, there are numerous counterarguments that could be waged against both of these approaches. Dunleavy (1991) , for example, found fault with the proposed outcomes of early rational choice perspectives of bureaucratic behavior. While not questioning the previously mentioned maximand of bureaucrats, he argued that it would be far more rational for bureaucrats to spend their time attempting to maximize their individual-level utility as opposed to their collective utility. It is more difficult to discern a person's contribution to a collective endeavor (such as voting) than to an individual project. Therefore, bureaucrats should spend their time on activities that will get them noticed by their superiors and potentially promoted. This argument suggests that altering voting behavior for budget-maximizing purposes may not be a priority for bureaucrats. In addition, the likelihood of casting the deciding ballot in an election would be miniscule, which would further diminish the incentive to vote in a bureaucratic fashion. In other words, it would be more rational to focus internally than externally to increase power.
Shifting to the other school of thought, attitudinal support for the BVM is premised on the existence of PSM. However, even if PSM does exist and impacts bureaucrats, it may tug government employees in opposing ideological directions. For example, Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) described the two dimensions of ideology as "contextualism" and "absolutism," which could be likened to liberalism and conservatism, respectively. Contextualists have an optimistic view of human nature and possess high levels of empathy, which are the types of traits that may be associated with those who possess high levels of PSM. Absolutists, on the contrary, emphasize in-group unity, are tolerant of inequality, and most importantly for bureaucrats, prefer rigid hierarchies. Government bureaucracies are defined by their rules. Employment in such conditions, therefore, may increase someone's preference for rules, or someone desiring rules may seek out government employment. If so, bureaucrats may show both contextualist (liberal) and absolutist (conservative) tendencies. This suggests that, even if PSM is treated as a given, it should not also be assumed that those with PSM are more liberal or more Democratic.
The final critique of the foundation of the BVM comes from potential contradictions due to the breadth of activities that are performed by government. For example, those who work in the Department of Defense may want more government spending but may be more likely to support Republican candidates, who are historically more supportive of military interventions (Klein & Stern, 2004) . In addition, some policies may not fall into liberal or conservative categories; rather, they may be more regional (e.g., agriculture and shipping policies). These nuances further complicate the relationship between bureaucrats, ideology, and vote choice.
In a similar vein, many scholars suggest that bureaucrats behave just like everyone else. For example, work has shown that bureaucrats are similar to the public on many general measures, as they are no more supportive of increased government spending and have just as much confidence in elected officials as nongovernment employees (Lewis, 1990) . Other studies have shown high levels of congruency between bureaucrats and nonbureaucrats on policy issues such as utility regulation and environmental regulation (Gormley, Hoadley, & Williams, 1983; Konisky, 2008) . If bureaucrats are similar to their private sector counterparts, then there may be no reason to suspect that their ideological beliefs or voting patterns should be entirely dissimilar.
Most importantly, the majority of these critiques have remained constant in the period under study. The rational choice and attitudinal criticisms could be levied at any time. As government has continued to expand (CBO, 2014) , it may be argued that the traits of contemporary bureaucrats may have become more nuanced over time. However, the overwhelming strength of the aforementioned criticisms suggests that there has never been a relationship between government employment, ideology, and vote choice.
In summary, the BVM assumes that bureaucrats are different from the public due to either rational choice or attitudinal constraints. However, the rational choice critique of the voting behavior of bureaucrats, the potential links between PSM and numerous ideological dimensions, as well as the diversity of government activities, all very strongly suggest that government employment may not have an effect on ideology or on vote choice. In addition, changes over time in government functions may have only served to increase the skepticism that bureaucrats are different. These critiques of the BVM lead to the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Government employment does not have an effect on ideology. Hypothesis 2: Government employment does not have an effect on vote choice.
Data and Method
Data come from surveys administered from 1982 through 2012 via the American National Election Studies (ANES). 1 The data start in 1982 because that is when the ANES began asking about the key variable of interest: government employment. 2 The question used for this variable asks the following: "Are/were you employed by a federal, state, or local government?" 3 The dependent variables are vote choice and ideology. Vote choice was modeled using selections from major party candidates in presidential elections (i.e., Republican or Democrat). 4 Therefore, probit models were used to model each separate election. This was coded as a dummy with 0 indicating a Democratic vote and 1 indicating a Republican vote.
Ideology, on the contrary, has seven levels: extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate, slightly conservative, conservative, and extremely conservative. This is an ordinal variable because while there is an intrinsic order to the different levels of the variable, the distance between the levels is unknown. That is, although it makes sense that "moderate" would be between "slightly liberal" and "slightly conservative," there is no unit of measure to describe the distance between "moderate" and "slightly conservative." Ideology was scaled so that conservative values were higher. 5 Because ideology is ordinal and has multiple categories, an ordered logit model sounds as if it would be appropriate to use. However, one of the assumptions of an ordered logit model is the "proportional odds assumption." This assumes that the coefficients of all the independent variables are the same across all levels of the dependent variable. The proportional odds assumption can be assessed using a Wald test after running an ordered logit model (Long & Freese, 2006) . The Wald test individually assesses every independent variable. Therefore, every model for every year was assessed to see whether it violated this assumption; all of them were found to have at least one independent variable in violation. When a model is seen to have violated the proportional odds assumption, a generalized ordered logit model is needed. This model allows those coefficients that violate the proportional odds assumption to vary at different levels of the dependent variable. This does not suggest that artificial restrictions have been placed on the data; those that do not violate the proportional odds assumption by their nature do not vary across different levels, so their effects are constant and they remain constant in a generalized ordered logit model. 6 For example, an ordered logit model was run on data from 1982. If the proportional odds assumption was met, then the coefficients for every independent variable would be constant for every level of ideology. However, the variables for age, college, and party identification were shown not to be proportional after a Wald test was conducted. Therefore, a general ordered logit model was used, which allowed the coefficients for those three aforementioned variables to vary across the different levels of the dependent variable while the remaining coefficients remained constant. This model can be seen in Table 1 . Earlier studies of the BVM that used ideology as a dependent variable collapsed it so that it was dichotomous (Jensen et al., 2009 ). The generalized ordered logit model, however, allows for inspection of the independent variables at each level of the dependent variable. For example, there may be an effect of government employment on ideology at certain levels of ideology but not all of them; the generalized ordered logit model would capture those inconsistent effects. This potentially allows for a more generous test of the theory; if the effect of government employment is not constant across all levels of ideology, making ideology dichotomous may lead researchers to infer that there is no effect when one is actually present. Therefore, using a generalized ordered logit model makes it more likely to find an effect of government employment on ideology and is a more stringent test of the hypothesis. In addition, the ANES in 2006 and 2010 were recontacts from the studies from 2004 and 2008, respectively. Because the variables of interest were not asked again in those studies, modeling those years would only serve to replicate the results from the prior data sets. Therefore, those years were omitted.
The remaining independent variables were repurposed from Jensen et al. (2009) , one of the most recent studies to include the United States in a test of the BVM. The independent variables for both models were age, gender, education, income, party identification, government employment, and union membership. 7 Ideology was included as an independent variable in the model for vote choice. Age and income were coded as continuous variables, while gender, education, government employment, and union membership were dummy coded. Party identification was scaled from strong Democrat to strong Republican. 8 These demographic controls provide a generous test of the BVM, as contextual variables relating to specific elections and individual-level variables measuring campaign interest have been omitted. 9
Results
The model of the effect of government employment on ideology is presented in Table 1 . The table contains the results only from 1982. Although many are familiar with the presentation of results from a generalized ordered logit model, it is still infrequently used, so a brief discussion of the table is warranted.
To interpret each panel, collapse the dependent variable so that is it dichotomous. For example, the coefficients from the independent variables in the top panel in the first table should be seen as modeling a dependent variable that is "extremely liberal" versus "all else." Then, interpret the coefficients as if they were in a model with a dichotomous dependent variable; for example, positive coefficients mean that larger values on that particular covariate make higher values of the dependent variable more likely. For those variables that meet the proportional odds assumption, interpretation is straightforward, as the coefficients are unchanging across all of the panels. For those that violate the assumption, the coefficient changes at each level of the dependent variable. For example, in this model, college education had a liberalizing effect only on those who were "liberal" to "slightly liberal."
Turning to the variable of interest, it is seen that government employment does not have an effect at any level of ideology. For the sake of simplicity, the second table contains only the coefficient and standard error for government employment at all six levels of the dependent variable across the remaining 14 models. 10 In brief, it can be seen that the other independent variables have interesting effects at differing levels of the dependent variable. For example, age consistently has a conservative effect, except at the highest level of conservatism. College occasionally provides a conservative as well as a liberalizing effect. The coefficient for party identification is normally much larger at middle levels of ideology, suggesting that it plays a more important role for moderates. However, the most important takeaway is that government employment is never significant across 84 levels of the dependent variable. These results strongly suggest that government employment does not have an effect on ideology, supporting the first hypothesis (see Table 2 ). Table 3 reports the results of the tests of government employment on vote choice. 11 In brief, ideology and party identification consistently affect vote choice. Increases in age and income suggest more Republican voting, whereas the effect of education varies. More pertinent, however, is that government employment had no effect on vote choice in any of the elections analyzed, which supports the second hypothesis.
Discussion
These results conflict sharply with the earliest studies of the BVM. What might explain this difference? It is assumed that the criticisms of the original premises of the BVM that were discussed earlier in this article have at least remained constant over time, so the reason for the differences must lie elsewhere. Many Meier (1975) . These statistical shortcomings may explain the inconsistencies over time of the results. So why might bureaucrats look so much like the general public? It may be that work in government for many is not a calling but simply a "job." Others may feel a drive to serve the public but have sought employment in the nonprofit sector, which is growing faster than government employment (Urban Institute). In addition, the diversity of functions of bureaucrats suggests that both liberals and conservatives may be drawn to serve. In other words, for every Leslie Knope there may be a Ron Swanson. 12 This study does raise some important criticisms of the use of the BVM. One possible critique of this study is that the measurement of "government employment" is too blunt. As was mentioned earlier, bureaucrats in different fields may be more liberal or conservative than one another. The level of employment may also matter, as studies have shown that senior officials in government tend to be more conservative (Dolan, 2002) . The variable used in this study does have the advantage of being included in surveys across many decades, which allows for this longitudinal analysis. However, future surveys should incorporate a more nuanced measurement to allow for more thorough hypothesis testing.
In addition to the type of employment within government, it is also important to consider type of employment elsewhere. As was shown by Park and Perry (2013) , government employment has declined since the 1970s while it has increased in the social and health fields. Their analysis also suggested that bureaucrats and those who work in the private sector were quite alike while those in the nonprofit sector were very different. Perhaps future surveys should also include more finely grained questions concerning occupation to better explore these findings. Although this study focuses only on the United States, these criticisms of the BVM may extend internationally. At the very least, there is no reason to suspect that the rational choice critique would fail to apply to bureaucrats in other countries. However, the attitudinal claim may be different. Other countries may have great differences between bureaucrats and nonbureaucrats, or a country may have a more liberal tilt than United States. These scenarios could explain the differences that have been seen between countries. The findings from this article suggest that others may wish to take a longitudinal look at the BVM in other countries to see whether they produce similar results.
How might the BVM be altered to still guide agendas in the United States? Based on the work of Dunleavy (1991) , scholars may wish to reconsider where bureaucrats focus their efforts to expand their power. As opposed to looking at external factors such as vote choice, it may be more fruitful to look internally at how bureaucrats lobby within a bureaucracy to increase their power. Government spending is still a sizeable amount of GDP. Any attempt to better understand what drives that force by altering the BVM should be embraced.
Conclusion
Earlier studies showed that government employees were more likely to support Democrats and were more liberal; however, later studies failed to replicate these results. In reviewing the BVM, this article also suggests that there should never be a relationship between these variables in the United States during the years analyzed. This study includes the time periods that were under examination in all of these past works and concludes that government employment never had an effect on ideology or on vote choice.
The results in this article speak to the importance of revisiting questions in the field. The BVM has had success in the United States in one form or another for decades, but this study shows the benefits of questioning and reevaluating long-held truisms. Assessing our foundations allows the field to progress.
Methodologically, the results of this article highlight the importance of using longitudinal data and incorporating different statistical methods. Using multiple data sets decreases the chance of making incorrect inferences. Decades of surveys allow researchers to more fully examine phenomenon. In addition, using novel models may allow researchers to answer questions in different fashions.
The BVM has long served an important role in the public administration literature. It arose out of a desire to explain the growth of government and evolved into a framework for understanding how government employees are different from the rest of society. The results in this article suggest that it may be time for the BVM to evolve again. There is little doubt that the BVM can still guide research; however, it may have to adapt to reach its fullest potential. 
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Notes
1. Descriptive statistics may be found in the appendix. 2. The percentage of government employees in the models ranged from 10.78% to 25.16%, with larger percentages in later years. 3. Retired government employees were included with current government employees. Earlier work has attempted to disentangle whether or not the bureaucratic theory of voting is a consequence of government employment or an intrinsic part of those who seek out government employment, but no definitive conclusions have yet to have been made (Garand, Parkhurst, & Seoud, 1991 were run with retired employees excluded, and the results did not substantively change. 4. Vote choice ranged from . 334 (2008) to .582 (1984) . 5. The mean of ideology ranged from 4.19 to 4.45 with standard deviations ranging from 1.26 to 1.94, suggesting that all of the samples were slightly skewed in a conservative direction. 6. A variable was seen as violating the proportional odds assumption if it failed a Wald test at a 0.05 level. 7. As was noted by Jensen, Sum, and Flynn (2009) , "Our aim is not to advance a full model of political attitudes and voting behavior, but rather to evaluate variance between public and nonpublic sector employees. Therefore, limits in the number of control variables available in the [data set] should not impact the ability to evaluate the BVM predictions through the models" (p. 717, footnote 3). However, additional campaign-specific variables were also tested. Model fit scores did not justify the additions of these variables, nor were the conclusions reached by the simpler models called into question; therefore, the original models were retained. 8. Correlation tests show that the highest correlation between any two variables across all the models is 0.236, which is low and not suggestive of multicollinearity (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2012) . The distributions of the variables were constant across all the data sets with three exceptions: union membership, which declined by about five points, and income and education, which increased slightly. Descriptive statistics are available in the appendix. 9. In addition, Jensen et al. (2009) include an interaction between government employment and union membership. This was not significant in any model and has been omitted. 10. The full models are presented in the appendix. Model fit scores suggested that the generalized ordered logit provided the best degree of fit. Although these model fit scores vary across models, it is important to note that they should not be compared with one another but rather compared with other models using the same data for the same years. Because the variable for "government employment" never violated the proportional odds assumption, it was constant across all levels of the dependent variable and only one result per year needs to be reported. 11. The full models are presented in the appendix. 12. These are fictional liberal and libertarian characters, respectively, from the NBC show Parks and Recreation.
